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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the magnitude of public/private wage differentials in 
Pakistan using data drawn from the 2001-02 Labour Force Survey. Pakistan 
Labour Force Survey is a nationwide survey containing micro data from all over 
the country containing demographic and employment information. As in many 
other countries, public sector workers in Pakistan tend to have higher average 
pay and educational levels as compared to their private sector counterparts. 
First, this paper presents the inter-sectoral earning equations for the three main 
sectors of the economy, i.e., public, private, and state-owned enterprises. These 
results are further decomposed into “treatment” and “endowment effect”. To 
examine the role of human capital in wage gap, the rate of return to different 
levels of schooling is calculated. These rates of return to education may be 
important for policy formulation. The relative earning share is also worked out 
to look into the distribution of wages across the occupational categories. The 
earning equations are estimated with and without correction for selectivity, 
which is also the main objective of the study, i.e., to find out if any non-random 
selection is taking place within these three sectors of employment. 
 
JEL classification: J32,  J45,  J24 
Keywords: Wage Differentials, Rate of Return to Education, Public 
Sector Labour Markets 
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1.  INTRODUCTION∗ 
The inter-sectoral wage differentials have received a great deal of 
research attention in recent years because this is viewed as supporting efficiency 
wage theories. These theories predict that some firms find it profitable to pay 
their workers wages above the going rate. The causes of variation in wages and 
earnings among people are complex and controversial. The different levels of 
earnings reflect the decision of individuals to investment in human capital and 
the decision to acquire skill. Moreover, the research on wage differentials 
explains the usefulness of the human capital approach to explaining variation in 
earnings. The factors like education, occupation, gender, regional location, 
nature of employment and the sector of employment play important role in wage 
differential. 
The concept of human capital pertains to skills, experience, and 
knowledge that have economic value to firms. Although the theory was 
originally developed to study the economic value of education [Schultz (1960)], 
more recently it has been applied to selection, training, compensation, and 
human resource management practices in general [Flamholtz and Lacey (1981); 
Perry (1991); Wallace and Fay (1988)]. Firms do not actually ‘own’ human 
capital, it is embodied in employees, who are free (within limits) to move from 
one firm to another [Becker (1962); Jacoby (1991)]. Even if employees stay 
with a firm, their contribution depends on their willingness to perform. 
Therefore, the logic underlying human capital considerations is straight forward: 
individuals who have made personal investments in education, job-relevant 
skills, and experience should earn a premium. 
The wage differentials between the public and private sector have been 
analysed rigorously in the industrialised world [for example, Kruger and 
Summers (1988); Terrell (1993); Gindling (1991)].  More recently, Said (2004), 
using data for Egypt, found a wage gap in favour of the private sector for males 
which was reversed when wages were replaced by a broader compensation 
measure. Mengistae (1999) founds a sizeable pay gap in the urban labour 
markets of Ethiopia. 
There exists a modest volume of empirical work undertaken on the 
public sector pay gap for developing countries, which shows that the source 
                                                 
Acknowledgements: The author acknowledges the invaluable guidance of Dr Barry Reilly 
(University of Sussex, UK), as well as the comments offered by the referees. However, the author 
remains responsible for any errors. She is also thankful to Dr Nadeem Ul Haque and Dr Ejaz Ghani 
for their encouragement.   
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of rents primarily lies with public sector. Boudarbat (2004) notes a 
preference for the public sector employment in Africa and a willingness 
among the educated to make queues for well paid and stable public sector 
jobs. The author notes a sizeable public sector pay differential in Morocco 
for the highly educated. Van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1988) for Cote 
D’Ivoire highlights the importance of selection bias in drawing any 
reasonable interpretation. 
 
2.  DATA 
This study uses cross-section data drawn from the nationally 
representative Labour Force Survey (LFS) of Pakistan for 2001-02.  The 
working sample used is based on those in wage employment and comprises a 
total of 7352 workers after discarding missing values and unusable 
observations.  This total consists of 3694, 3310 and 348 workers in the 
private, public and state owned enterprise (SOE) sectors respectively.  Table 
1 of Appendix presents the summary statistics and definitions of the 
variables used in our analysis.  
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.  The Basic Model 
In approaching the problem, the labour market is divided into private 
sector, public sector and state owned enterprises.1 In this human resource market 
analysis we are not controlling for labour market participation effects, rather we 
examine the setoral selection into one of the three categories. For each worker i, 
wage in the jth sector of the labour market is given by 
Wij = Χ’ji βj + Z’ji δj + µji            … … … … … (1) 
where W  is a column vector of logarithmic values of hourly wage for 
individuals in sector j;  Xji is a k × 1 vector of person specific explanatory 
variables; Zji is a q × 1 vector of other demographic variables, while β and δ are 
vectors of the unknown parameters. The subscript j = 1 if worker belongs to the 
private sector, 2 if the worker is in the public sector and 3 if the worker is from 
state owned enterprises. The error term µj ∼ N (0, σj2) and subscript i is for each 
individual.  
                                                 
1The private sector is defined to include workers employed in, cooperative societies, 
individual ownership and partnerships. The government sector includes federal government, 
provincial government, public enterprises and local bodies. State owned enterprises (SOEs) are 
defined as private limited companies and public limited companies. 
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The hourly wage2 is used as the dependent variable because hours worked 
varies over the life-cycle, with the level of education and may also vary across 
sectors. It is necessary to distinguish the effects on earnings of hours worked 
from those due to variation in wages. Seven occupational categories, defined 
according to the standard occupational classification, are included. To capture 
the age effect on earnings, we introduced age spline to examine the variation in 
earnings in different age groups. For this we introduced three age groups; with 
“knots” defining age groups at 14–25, 26–45 and 46–60 respectively. This 
allows for age effect on wages to vary over distinct segment of the life-cycle. To 
control for provincial variations in wages, we include three dummies for 
provinces while dummy variables for urban-rural residence, marital status, 
gender and the time spent in current district of living are also included. 
 
3.2.  Multinomial Logit Model 
As we are dealing with three sectors of employment (i.e., public, private 
and SOEs) in the labour market. 
 Let yij = 1 if the ith individual chooses the jth alternative and 
 let   yij = 0 otherwise, where j =1,2,3. 
 Prob[yij = 1] = Pij  and since the probabilities must sum to unity we have:  
            Pi1 +  Pi2  + Pi3 = 1. 
In its more general form with j alternatives, the multinomial logit is 
expressed as: 
∑ β+α
β+α
k
j
jjj
jjj
ij
Χexp
ΧexpΡ
][
][=  … … … … … (2) 
‘k’ is the number of outcomes being modeled.  This, in general, expresses the 
probability that an individual with characteristics Xi chooses the jth sector of 
employment.  
 
3.3.  Correction for Selectivity Bias 
The estimation of wage equations for three sectors of employment 
(described above) by OLS may be subject to selection bias if the sample of 
workers observed in a particular sector is non-random in some way in terms of 
the wage distribution. Given non-randomness the estimated coefficients may be 
potentially biased and the computation of sectoral wage differentials is thus 
affected.  
                                                 
2The hourly wages expressed in rupees, is calculated by dividing weekly earnings by 
number of hours worked per week. 
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In this context, the multinomial logit (MNL) model provides a potential 
solution to the problem.  Lee (1983) proposed a more general approach to the 
issue than that originally offered by the Heckman (1979) procedure.  The 
procedure outlined is also a two-step procedure but exploits estimates from the 
MNL to construct the selection correction terms.  The following steps are 
followed: 
 (1) We estimate the reduced form MNL for the j=1, 2, 3 (i.e., for public, 
private and SOEs) categories and obtain the parameter estimates and 
the predicted probabilities for each individual i=1,....,N for each 
category j. The predicted probabilities are defined as Pi1, Pi2, Pi3. 
 (2) Next we obtain the ‘normits’ or standardised z values for each 
individual for each category j using the inverse standard normal 
operator.  Thus: 
 zi1 = Φ–1(Pi1),  zi2 = Φ–1(Pi2), and zi3 = Φ–1(Pi3) for all i=1,.....N. 
 (3) For the public sector, correction term used is: 
 
Ρ
p
i
i
i
1
1
1 )((
pub
Φλ
−φ=    for i=1,2,.......M … … … (3) 
and similarly the correction terms for private and SOEs will be as follows; 
P
p
i
i
prii
2
2
1 )((
i
Φλ
−φ=    for i=M+1,.......N … … … (4) 
P
p
i
i
soei
3
3
1 )((
i
Φλ
−φ=    for i=N+1,.......L … … … (5) 
This selection term is analogous to the one computed in the Heckman 
case though now based on MNL estimates. 
 (4) Then we estimate the following equation by OLS inserting the relevant 
correction term: 
Wij = αj + βjXij  – 
ij
ij
j P
z )(φµ  + uij … … … … (6) 
for j = 1, 2, 3 and where E(uij) = 0.  
Lee (1983) demonstrates that the outcome W conditional on the selection 
is given by the above expression.  In this application µj = ρjσj. The ρj parameters 
capture the strength of the correlation between the unobservables determining Wj 
and those determining the jth sectoral attachment modeled by the MNL. The σj 
parameters represent the standard error in the jth equation for W.  This is 
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analogous to the Heckman two-step case. Thus, using expression (1) the wage 
equation can be written as; 
Wij = Χ’ji βj + Z’ji δj – ρjσj λj + vji   ... … … … (7) 
 
3.4.  Decomposition of Wage Differentials 
The most popular econometric framework to measure unequal treatment 
in wages was developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) in the context of 
gender. According to this framework, discrimination is revealed by differences 
in the estimated coefficients. After correction and adjusting the λ term in wage 
decomposition the framework is given by: 
)(ˆ)ˆˆ(' pripubpubpripubprii   WW prpub χχβ+β−βχ=− −   
             )λλ σρ−σρ+ priprprpubpubpub ii **(  … … … (8) 
 
))(ˆ)ˆ )ˆ( prisoesoeprisoepriprisoe WW χχβχ=− −β+β−  
             λσρ−λσρ+ pripriprisoesoesoe **(  … …    (9) 
and 
)(ˆ)ˆˆ( soepubpubsoepubsoesoepub   WW χχβ+β−β′χ=− −  
             )**( λσρλσρ −+ pripubpripubpubpub  … … … (10) 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1.  Results for Multinomial Logit Models (MNL) 
The selection equation results based on estimation of the MNL model are 
presented in Table 2 of Appendix almost all the estimated effects for the variables 
are significant at conventional levels and have the expected signs as well. While 
comparing between public and private sector as compared to the category of no 
formal education all categories are pulled towards the public sector. It was quite 
expected, as the level of education increases the opportunity to get a public sector 
job also increases. This finding is also consistent with the literature estimating the 
probability of the public vs. private sector employment with logit or probit function 
[see for example: Terrell (1993) and Blank (1994)].  Similarly, in younger age there 
is a greater probability that one will get a public sector job.  
 
4.2.  The Wage Equation Results and Correction for Selectivity Bias 
The estimates for the earnings equation for the three different sectors of 
employment (with and without correction for selectivity bias) are reported in 
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Table 3 of Appendix. The estimated coefficients are jointly significant, as 
indicated by the F-test. Some comments on the coefficients are in order. Most of 
the variables included in the earning equations are estimated with statistical 
precision (low standard error). The mean sums of square are 0.43723, 0.5527 
and 0.50841 in the public, private and SOEs respectively. This shows 
compressed waged distribution in the public sector as compared to private 
sector, however in SOEs it may be attributable to a relatively small number of 
observations.  
After the correction for selectivity the magnitude and significance of 
variables changes particularly in the private sector. The selectivity term is 
significant only in private sector. Head of the household is not included in the 
wage equation as it is used in the multinomial logit model for the identification 
purpose. Starting with human capital variables, educational categories are 
significant and well defined across the three sectors.  
The estimated rate of return to educational qualification is calculated with 
the following well-known formula: 
RORe  =  
ss
rr
tt
nn
1
1
−
−
−
−
 
Where 
 RORe = Rate of return for each educational level 
 rn = earnings equation coefficient at current educational level 
 rn–1 = earnings equation coefficient at previous educational level 
 st3 = time spend in current educational level 
 st–1 = years spend in previous educational level.  
The rate of returns to different educational qualifications (with and 
without correction for selectivity are presented in Table 1) for primary education 
(five years schooling) are .99 percent and 1.15 percent in public and private 
sector.  However, the coefficients of primary and middle level of education are 
insignificant in state owned enterprises. While comparing between primary and 
matriculation certificate holder, after primary education if an individual spent 
five more years in schooling to get the matriculation certificate the rate of return 
to education increases to 0.94 percent, 0.18 percent and 6.4 percent in the public, 
private and SOEs, respectively. Similarly, while looking into the difference 
between intermediate and graduation, graduates are getting 6.4 percent, 17.43 
percent and 1.11 percent more as compared to those having intermediate 
certificate in the three sectors of employment. The decrease in the rate of returns  
                                                 
3While calculating RORe (rate of return to education) it was assumed that it takes six years 
to complete the primary education, if one wants to get middle school education it will take three 
more years after primary school education, to get matriculation certificate one need to spend eleven 
years in school. Moreover for intermediate, graduation, professional degrees and post-graduate 
education the required time will be 13, 15, 18 and 19 years. 
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Table 1 
Rate of Return for Educational Categories  
(with and without Correction for Selection Bias) 
ROR for Educational 
Categories without Correction 
for Selectivity Bias 
ROR  for Educational 
Categories with Correction for 
Selectivity Bias Educational  
Categories 
Full 
Sample Public Private SOEs Public Private SOEs 
Primary 1.5% 2.34% 1.56% 0.21% 0.99% 1.15% 0.19% 
Middle 2.24% 0.97% 2.85% 1.06% 0.94% 2.33% 0.67% 
Matric  3.94% 6.29% 1.25% 6.50% 6.24% 0.18% 6.40% 
Intermediate 5.81% 5.22% 7.36% 3.93% 5.17% 6.25% 4.33% 
Graduate 9.02% 6.40% 17.4% 11.27% 6.41% 17.3% 1.11% 
Professional 9.23% 7.27% 13.8% 5.80% 7.29% 14.12% 5.60% 
Postgraduate 5.44% 4.89% 37.7% 2.97% 4.87% 12.02% 2.80% 
 
in few of successive higher categories of education i.e., for matriculation 
category after middle school certificate in the public and private sector, graduate 
after intermediate in SOE, professionals in the public and SOE, and post-
graduates in all the three sectors may reflect the law of diminishing returns to 
the formation of human capital at the margin. The same overall pattern are found 
by Psacharopoulos (1994),4 in his study the highest rate of returns are for 
primary level of education, but for Pakistan he reported 20 percent, 11 percent 
and 21 percent for primary, secondary and higher level of education. However 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002)5 presented the global update for return to 
investment in education that is in case of Pakistan the ROR to education are 8.4 
percent, 13.7 percent and 31.2 percent for primary, secondary and higher 
categories while using the data for the year 1991. The ROR for these three 
categories in India are reported at 2.6 percent, 17.6 percent and 18.2 percent 
respectively, for the year 1995, in case of Nepal these are 16.6 percent, 8.5 
percent and 12.0 percent respectively, in 1999. 
In the private sector a huge gap exists between those that do not have any 
formal education and those with some education. This gap goes on widening as 
the levels of education increases. These results show the different reward system 
in private sector and changing trend of structure of different employment sectors 
in Pakistan. The wage gap among the employees of State Owned Enterprises is 
lowest for different educational levels.  However, the training coefficient in all 
the three sectors is insignificant. 
While comparing rates of return to education with and without correction 
for selectivity it is evident that estimates are changed significantly in the private 
sector. Without correction, the rate of return for matriculation category is 1.25 
percent but with correction for selectivity, it becomes 0.18 percent. Another 
                                                 
4Psacharopoulos (1994).  
5Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002). 
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large difference between corrected and uncorrected wage equation in private 
sector lies in post-graduate category. Without correction rate of return for post- 
graduates is 37.77 percent but after correction it becomes 12.02 percent. It is 
apparent from the result that a year of education yields a greater increase in 
wages in the private than in the public sector, despite the possibility, more 
educated have greater likelihood of being in the public sector. This perhaps 
reflect the scarcity of educated people in the private sector. This is in agreement 
with the finding by Psacharopoulos (1994) that the returns in the private/ 
competitive sector of the economy are higher than for those who work in the 
public/non-competitive sector of employment. Moreover, according to him these 
findings lend support in using labour market earnings as a proxy for productivity 
in estimating the return to education. 
Now coming back to the wage equations, after discussing the rate of 
return for education next variable is age that enters in the wage equation as a 
continuous age spline variable. Particularly, throughout the range of values of 
age (with and with out correction for selectivity), income will be rising, but the 
slope may change at some distinct levels.6 To examine the time profile of 
earnings of an individual we divide it in three sub samples.  The results for age 
spline in three sector are quite interesting. In public sector, highest marginal 
premium is in young age i. e., 14 to 25 years. Then the marginal effect slows 
down for the remaining two age splines. Similarly, in case of the private sector, 
there is sharp increase at an early age then the marginal effect decreases. 
However, the SOE present a little bit of a different picture, the only significant 
age group is 26 to 40 years and in this age group there is a sharp marginal 
increase in earnings. 
Gender is another important determinant of the wage. The estimates in 
all three sectors show that males are earning more as compared to females. 
This wage gap shows a male wage advantage in the overall employment 
sector. While looking into the marital status the estimated coefficient shows 
that married individuals are earning more as compared to those in other 
categories.  
The estimated coefficients of occupational categories are an important 
part of the wage equation. In all the three sectors, managers, legislators and 
senior officials are getting more earning premium as compared to any other 
occupational categories. The omitted category is ‘clerks’. Starting from the 
public sector, all the estimated coefficients of the occupational dummies are 
statistically significant, managers and professionals earn more than clerks and 
all the other categories have negative signs. The relative earnings for each 
occupational category is reported in Table 2 and has been calculated with the 
following formula; 
                                                 
6Green (2003). 
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Table 2 
Relative Earnings for Occupational Categories in the Public and Private Sector 
and SOEs (with and without Correction for Selectivity Bias) 
Relative Earning without 
Correction for Selectivity 
Relative Earning with Correction 
for Selectivity 
Occupation Public Private SOE Public Private SOE 
Average ln(Earning)  
per  Hour 3.2031 2.518371 3.158366 3.2031 2.518371 3.158366 
Managers 46.03% 40.21% 39.02% 46.24% 41.34% 37.88% 
Professionals 31.46% 20.92% 16.02% 3146% 18.61% 17.26% 
Tech 4.09% –9.78% 16.48% 3.98% –15.64% 17.23% 
Clerks –3.00% 15.09% –2.82 –3.12% 8.27% –1.99% 
Service –17.56% –12.88% –15.71% –17.48% –12.3% –12.63% 
Skill –19.81% –28.37% 21.21% –16.70% –35.83% 19.68% 
Craft –0.67% 7.40% –12.58% –20.02% 10.19% –13.38% 
Plant –3.20% 12.51% –8.29% –0.19% 17.24% –9.34% 
Element –19.91% –15.95% –16.31% –19.98% –19.01% –16.26% 
 
Related share of occupationj =  j
k
j
jj occu×∂−∂ ∑
=1
ˆˆ  
Where 
 ∂j  = is estimated coefficient of jth occupational category 
 joccu  = mean of earning in the jth occupational category 
 j
k
j
j occu×∂∑
=1
ˆ  = weighted average of all occupational categories 
and j=1..k, is for nine occupational categories according to their standard 
classification. 
On average, managers and professionals in the public sector earn 46.24 
percent and 31.46 percent above the average, respectively. Service and 
elementary workers respectively earn 17.4 percent and 19.98 percent less then 
the average. The key point in Table 2 is that although professionals are doing 
above average in the public sector, the dispersion looks more pronounced in the 
private sector. The lowest relative earnings share is –35.8 percent (skill) and –20 
percent (craft) in the public sector. 
Regarding earning share of employees in the private sector, the managers 
earn 41.34 percent above the average earnings. Individuals in other occupational 
categories are earning less than the average earnings of the average private 
sector. In the corrected wage equation the relative effects decreases further (i.e., 
for technicians, service and elementary occupations). Besides from this, the sign 
of estimated coefficient for craft and plant workers is changed from negative to 
positive in corrected wage equation. However the evidence shows that there is 
smaller gap between below average categories. In the SOEs, like managers are 
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the highest earning category, as it is in the public and private sector. Technicians 
in SOEs are earning above average earnings of this sector.  
Let us now turn to the interpretation of the coefficients on the selection 
terms. The results show that for public and SOEs sector, there is no correlation 
between unobserved factors across wages and selection. The estimate for λ2 
indicates the correlation between the unobserved factors and sector selection and 
wage in private sector. This coefficient shows that unobserved characteristics 
make it less likely that a person is found in private sector, and tends to improve 
a person’s wage in private sector.  For example the unobserved characteristics 
such as intelligence and motivation may decrease the probability that a person is 
found in the private sector, but those who posses these characteristics enjoy 
greater wage, ceteris paribus. In this case it can be concluded that individuals 
selected into the private sector earn lower earnings then those drawn at random 
from the working population. This sorting scheme may affect the productivity in 
these sectors, which is examined in detail in the following decomposition 
analysis.   
 
4.3.  Decomposition of Wage Differentials 
The overall decomposition results after correction for selectivity shows 
that public and SOEs sector paying more as compared to private sector. SOEs 
and public sector may be creaming (paying more wages to attract best 
candidates among a given level of education and experience). Nevertheless the 
results in the second-last column of Table 3 indicate the extent to which  the 
selection bias is lowering the public-private and SOEs-private wage 
differentials.  
 
Table 3  
Decomposition of Wage Equations with Correction for Selectivity Bias 
 
Unexplained or 
Treatment 
Differentials t-values 
Explained or 
Endowment 
Differentials t-values 
Due to 
Selection Total 
Ypublic —Yprivate    .506156 
(0.135904) 
3.7243 0.279410 
(0.07239) 
3.859 –0.1008 0.6847 
Ysoe – Yprivate 0.54344012 
(0.600564) 
0.9048 0.327440 
(0.064616) 
5.067 –0.230 0.639 
Ypublic – Ysoe –0.10777 
(0.551741) 
0.19533 0.022461 
(0.034734) 
0.646 0.1300 0.0447 
Ypublic denotes the log of hourly wage in the public sector. 
Yprivate denotes the log of hourly wage in private sector. 
Ysoe denotes the log of hourly wage in State Owned Enterprises sector. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The probit estimates for human capital variables show that more educated 
individuals, are pulled towards the public sector. As elsewhere, public sector 
workers in Pakistan tend to have both higher average pay and education levels 
compared to their private sector counterparts. The results of the sectoral 
attachment equation (probit equation) show that females are more attached with 
the public sector as compared to their male counterparts. In addition, the public 
sector in Pakistan has a more compressed wage distribution and a smaller gender 
pay gap than that prevailing in the private sector.     
The earning equations for the three sectors of employment have same 
trends for educational categories. Rate of returns to education founds in this 
study have the same overall pattern as found by Psacharopoulos (1994). The 
estimates for all the three sectors of labour market in Pakistan show that males 
are more advantaged in terms of earnings as compared to female counterpart. 
Thus wage gaps show a male wage advantage in the overall employment sector. 
The wage differentials between the public and the private sector are consistent 
with other developing countries. For instance, Terrell (1993) concluded that the 
wage differentials are in favour of the public sector and state owned enterprises 
while using the micro data from Haiti. The decomposition for earnings in these 
three sectors showed that sizable earning gap exist between public and private 
sector that may have adverse effects on the economy. 
The existence of a sizeable public-private sector differential has obvious 
implications for the Pakistan labour market in terms of worker’s job queues, 
wait unemployment, as well as adverse effects in recruitment, retention and 
incentive policies [Hyder and Reilly (2005)]. An obvious agenda for future 
research would be to investigate the extent of fringe benefits, which definitely 
contribute to wage differentials. Moreover, the existence of wage differentials 
between the public and the private sector may give rise to the phenomenon of 
‘wait’ unemployment; this must be explored.   
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Appendix  Table 1  
Summary Statistics 
  Public Private SOE 
Variable Definition Mean Mean Mean 
Lnhw 
 
Log of the hourly wage  3.203 
(0.593) 
 2.518 
(0.709) 
 3.158 
(0.724) 
Age Age of individual in years 37.149 
 9.294) 
30.233 
(11.015) 
35.986 
(10.54) 
Nfe 
 
 = 1 No formal education and 
 = 0, otherwise 
.1419 
 
.3351 
 
.2298 
 
Prim  =1 if individual has completed initial five years of education i.e., primary but below middle; =0, otherwise .1033 .2049 .1264 
Middle  =1 if individual has completed initial eight years of education i.e., middle but below matriculation;=0, otherwise .08483 .1285 .1206 
Matric  =1 if individual has completed initial ten years of education i.e., matriculation but below intermediate;=0, otherwise .2251 .1686 .2097 
Inter. 
 
 =1 if individual has completed two years for college education i.e., intermediate after matriculation but below 
university degree; =0, otherwise 
.1619 
 
.0619 
 
.0890 
 
Professional = if individual has professional degree in engineering, medicine, computer and agriculture; = 0, otherwise .0350 .0195 .0345 
University 
 
= 1 if individual has university degree but below post graduate; 
= 0, otherwise  
.1419 
 
.0573 
 
.1005 
 
P-grad 
 
= 1 if individual is M.A/M.Sc, M.Phil/Ph.D;= 0, otherwise .1057 
 
 .0238 
 
.0890 
 
Train 
 
= 1 if individual has ever completed any technical/vocational training; 
= 0, otherwise 
.0658 
 
.0433 
 
.0747 
 
Urban 
 
=1 if Living in urban  area and 
= 0, otherwise 
0.5924 
 
0.6429 
 
0.6609 
 
Punjab =1 if individual resides in Punjab; = 0, otherwise .3691 .5319 .3275 
Sindh 
 
= 1 if individual resides in Sind; = 0, otherwise .2698 
 
0.2766 
 
0.3563 
 
NWFP = 1 if individual resides in NEFP; = 0, otherwise .1812 .11829 .1321 
Balochistan = 1 if individual resides in Balochistan;= 0, otherwise .1798 .0731 .1839 
Continued— 
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Appendix Table 1—(Continued) 
Sincebirth = 1 if individual has resided in the district since birth; 
= 0, otherwise 
.8277 
 
.7861 
 
.7672 
 
Oneyear = 1 if individual has resided in the district for one year and 
= 0, otherwise 
.0085 
 
.0184 
 
.0143 
 
Fouryear = 1 if individual has resided in the district for four years and 
= 0, otherwise 
.0202 
 
.0437 
 
.0402 
 
Nineyear =1 if individual has resided in the district for nine years and 
= 0, otherwise 
.03081 
 
.0433 
 
.0402 
 
Aboveten = 1 if individual has resided in the district for district more then ten years or 
= 0, otherwise 
.1126 
 
.10828 
 
.1379 
 
Gender = 1 if individual is male;= 0, otherwise .8809 .90633 .9741 
Marr =1 if individual is married; = 0, otherwise .8558 .5544 .7701 
Nmarr = 1 if individual is unmarried;= 0, otherwise .1323 .4274 .2241 
Wnd = 1 individual is widowed or divorced; = 0, otherwise .01178 .01813 .00574 
Head = 1 If individual is head of the household; = 0, otherwise .661027 .4187 .6695 
Manager = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .05649 .04412 .10919 
Professionals = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .0972 .0401 .0574 
Technician = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .29244 .08743 .14367 
Clerk = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .14410 .0389 .0891 
Services = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .1259 .2005 .0603 
Skilled = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .01117 .00487 .01436 
Craft = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .04078 .2311 .1637 
Plant = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .03897 .15078 .1637 
Elementary = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .19274 .2019 .19827 
Sample Size  3310 3694 348 
 Notes:  The average values for the continuous measures and the sample proportion for the discrete measures are reported.   
             The standard deviations are also reported for the continuous variables. 
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Appendix Table 2 
Multinomial Logit Results for Selection between Public vs. 
 Private Sector and SOE vs. Private Sector 
Public vs. Private SOEs vs. Private 
Variables Co-efficients Z-Values Co-efficients Z-Values 
Primary 0.6875 
(0.1050) 
6.55*** 0.2264 
(0.2012) 
1.13 
Middle 1.1221 
(0.1176) 
9.54*** 0.7783 
(0.2111) 
3.69*** 
Matric 1.5277 
(0.1084) 
14.09*** 1.0352 
(0.1983) 
5.22*** 
Inter. 1.9593 
(0.1353) 
14.47*** 1.0943 
(0.26796) 
4.08*** 
Prof. 1.6870 
(0.2112) 
7.99*** 1.2122 
(0.4001) 
3.03*** 
Grad 1.8448 
(0.1436) 
12.84*** 1.1058 
(0.2812) 
3.93*** 
P-grade 2.4692 
(0.1777) 
13.89*** 1.8466 
(0.3154) 
5.85*** 
Train 0.28650 
(0.1363) 
2.10** 0.3426 
(0.2304) 
1.49* 
Age1 0.17520 
(0.0235) 
7.45*** –0.0215 
(0.0366) 
–0.59 
Age2 0.07407 
(0.0079) 
9.29*** 0.0832 
(0.0161) 
5.14*** 
Age3 –0.01062 
(0.0079) 
–1.33* –0.0174 
(0.0151) 
–1.15 
Nmarr –0.63191 
(0.1015) 
–6.22*** –0.0316 
(0.2162) 
–0.15 
Wnd –0.7288 
(0.2446) 
–2.98*** –1.0109 
(0.7327) 
–1.38* 
Gender –0.1735 
(0.1127) 
–1.54* 1.3009 
(0.3650) 
3.56*** 
Head 0.2343 
(0.0842) 
2.78*** 0.2518 
(0.1748) 
1.44* 
Urban –0.4382 
(0.0688) 
–6.37*** –0.0934 
(0.1349) 
–0.69 
Sindh 0.1473 
(0.0743) 
1.98** 0.5666 
(0.1417) 
4.00*** 
Coninued— 
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Appendix Table 2—(Continued)  
NWFP 0.5357 
(0.0903) 
5.93*** 0.4885 
(0.1890) 
2.58*** 
Baloch 1.3502 
(0.1050) 
12.85*** 1.4447 
(0.1831) 
7.89*** 
Oneyear –0.4134 
(0.2877) 
–1.44* 0.0594 
(0.4841) 
0.12 
Fouryear –0.7666 
(0.1854) 
–4.13*** –0.0519 
(0.3022) 
–0.17 
Nineyear –0.4246 
(0.1595) 
–2.66*** –0.1514 
(0.2985) 
–0.51 
Aboveten –0.1429 
(0.0969) 
–1.47* 0.1113 
(0.1810) 
0.61 
Manage –0.1335 
(0.1681) 
–7.94*** –0.2205 
(0.2928) 
–0.75 
Profess –0.6174 
(0.1653) 
–3.73*** –0.5692 
(0.3396) 
–1.68** 
Tech –0.0139 
(0.1332) 
–0.10 0.0583 
(0.2599) 
0.22 
Service –0.9798 
(0.1325) 
–7.39*** –1.4843 
(0.3096) 
–4.79*** 
Skill 0.4281 
(0.3544) 
1.21 0.9362 
(0.5758) 
1.63* 
Craft –2.0311 
(0.1523) 
–13.33*** –0.4408 
(0.2618) 
–1.68** 
Plant  –2.2352 
(0.1591) 
–14.05*** –0.4398 
(0.2717) 
–1.62* 
Element –0.2733 
(0.1383) 
–1.98** –0.0506 
(0.2689) 
–0.19 
Constant –5.0538 
(0.5875) 
–8.60*** –4.4330 
(0.2689) 
–4.57*** 
Multinomial  logistic regression. 
Comparison group is private sector. 
Number of observation = 7352. 
LR chi(62) = 3288.37. 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000. 
Log likelihood = –4601.3006. 
Note: All the estimates are white hetroscadastic consistent. 
***Denotes significant at 1 percent level of significance. **Denote significant at 5 percent 
level of significance. *10 percent level of significant using 2-tailed test.  
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Appendix Table 3 
Wage Equations for Public and Private Sector and SOEs  
(with and without Correction for Selection Bias) 
Earning Equation Results with  Correction Earning  Equation Results without correction 
Public Sector Private Sector SOEs Public Sector Private Sector SOE s 
Variables Coef. t-values Coef. t-values Coef. t-values Coef. t- values Coef. t- values Coef. t- values 
Educational Categories 
Primary 0.0595 
(0.0390) 
1.52* 0.0691 
(0.0284) 
2.43*** 0.0118 
(0.1025) 
0.12 0.0614 
(0.0293) 
2.09** 0.0939 
(0.0248) 
3.77*** .01275 
(.1125) 
0.11 
 
Middle 0.0876 
(0.0490) 
1.79** 0.1393 
(0.0355) 
3.92*** 0.03201 
(0.1188) 
0.27 0.0907 
(0.0276) 
3.28*** 0.1794 
(0.0295) 
6.07*** .04455 
(.0865) 
0.51 
 
Matric 0.2125 
(0.0563) 
3.78*** 0.1429 
(0.0400) 
3.57*** 0.1600 
(0.1207) 
1.33* 0.2166 
(0.0268) 
8.07*** 0.2046 
(0.0297) 
6.89*** .17466 
(.0908) 
1.92* 
 
Inter. 0.3160 
(0.0686) 
4.61*** 0.2679 
(0.0571) 
4.69*** 0.24679 
(0.1321) 
1.87** 0.3210 
(0.0325) 
9.88*** 0.35184 
(0.0413) 
8.52*** .25345 
(.1338) 
1.89* 
 
Prof. 0.6808 
(0.0733) 
9.28*** 0.9743 
(0.0818) 
11.90*** 0.5268 
(0.2011) 
2.62*** 0.6850 
(0.0769) 
8.90*** 1.0457 
(0.1032) 
10.13*** .54352 
(.2102) 
2.58*** 
 
Grad 0.4443 
(0.0670) 
6.63*** 0.6145 
(0.0614) 
10.00*** 0.4694 
(0.1437) 
3.27*** 0.4491 
(0.0353 
12.69*** 0.7004 
(0.0506) 
13.82*** .4788 
(.1718) 
2.79*** 
P-grad 0.6392 
(0.0785) 
8.14*** 0.9253 
(0.0896) 
10.32*** 0.5815 
(0.1633) 
3.56*** 0.6450 
(0.0435) 
14.80*** 1.0583 
(0.0824) 
12.83*** .59768 
(.1468) 
4.07*** 
 
Train 0.0474 
(0.0323) 
1.47* 0.0083 
(0.0462) 
0.18 0.0266 
(0.1147) 
0.23 0.0479 
(0.0372) 
1.29 .02155 
(.0481) 
.45 .03219 
(.1578) 
0.20 
Age spline 
Age1 0.0153 
(0.0118) 
1.29* 0.0353 
(0.0043) 
8.06*** 0.0115 
(0.0184) 
0.63 0.0160 
(0.0084) 
1.90* .03745 
(0.0043) 
8.70*** .01068 
(.0182) 
0.58 
 
Age2 0.0115 
(0.0028) 
4.08*** 0.0015 
(0.0032) 
0.47 0.0269 
(0.0098) 
2.74*** 0.0116 
(0.0019) 
6.07*** 0.0063 
(0.0024) 
2.65*** .0282 
(.0072) 
3.92*** 
Age3 0.0088 
(0.0020) 
4.43*** 0.0067 
(0.0028) 
2.36*** 0.00065 
(0.0073) 
0.09 0.0089 
(0.0022) 
4.04*** 0.0061 
(0.0029) 
2.11** .00031 
(.0097) 
0.03 
 
Continued— 
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Marital Status 
Nmarr –0.0519 
(0.0359) 
–1.44* -0.0366 
(0.0316) 
–1.16 –0.1696 
(0.1046) 
–1.62* –0.0538 
(0.2973) 
–1.81** –0.0666 
(0.0302) 
–2.20** -.16285 
(.0971) 
-1.68* 
Wnd 0.0819 
(0.0749) 
1.09 -0.0028 
(0.0730) 
–0.04 0.0868 
(0.3972) 
0.22 0.0799 
(0.0614) 
1.30 –0.0427 
(0.0750) 
–0.57 .06787 
(.2825) 
0.24 
 
Gender 0.1506 
(0.0278) 
5.42*** 0.4081 
(0.0349) 
11.68*** 0.2956 
(0.2459) 
1.20 0.14981 
(0.0293) 
5.11*** 0.4201 
(0.0431) 
9.75*** ..33151 
(.1396) 
2.37** 
Residence 
Urban 0.0851 
(0.0215) 
3.95*** 0.1305 
(0.0223) 
5.84*** 0.15201** 
(0.0684) 
2.22 0.0839 
(0.1575) 
5.33*** 0.11403 
(0.0211) 
5.38*** .15536 
(.0698) 
2.22** 
 
Province 
Sindh 0.0521 
(0.0203) 
2.57*** 0.1532 
(0.0223) 
6.84*** 0.1713** 
(0.0945) 
1.81 0.05231 
(0.0213) 
2.60*** 0.16092 
(0.0216) 
7.44*** .18586 
(.0653) 
2.84*** 
 
NWFP –0.0826 
(0.02672) 
–3.09*** -0.0740 
(0.0316) 
–2.34*** 0.0786 
(0.0953) 
0.82 -0.0813 
(0.0228) 
–3.55*** -0.0494 
(0.0308) 
–1.60 .08374 
(.0861) 
0.97 
 
Baloch 0.1684 
(0.0400) 
4.21*** 0.1796 
(0.0496) 
3.62*** -0.0088 
(0.15141) 
–0.06 0.1712 
(0.0212) 
8.05*** 0.25539 
(0.0340) 
7.51*** .01832 
(.0973) 
0.19 
Location Specific  
Human Capital Variables 
Oneyear 0.1084 
(0.0849) 
1.28* 0.0591 
(0.0685) 
0.86 0.44404 
(0.2370) 
1.87** 0.1073 
(0.0666) 
1.61* 0.0493 
(0.0534) 
0.92 .44873 
(.2528) 
1.77* 
 
Fouryear 0.0956 
(0.0606) 
1.58* 0.1996 
(0.0466) 
4.27*** 0.28271 
(0.1554) 
1.82** 0.0934 
(0.0611) 
1.53 0.17441 
(0.0363) 
4.80*** .29308 
(.1958) 
1.50 
 
Nineyear 0.0788 
(0.0465) 
1.69** 0.1126 
(0.0460) 
2.44*** 0.18526 
(0.1456) 
1.27 0.0777 
(0.0575) 
1.35 0.09555 
(0.0478) 
2.00** 0.1860 
(.2110) 
0.88 
 
Aboveten 0.1045 
(0.0263) 
3.96*** 0.11756 
(0.0310) 
3.79*** 0.2178 
(0.0971) 
2.24** 0.1041 
(0.0315) 
3.30*** 0.11181 
(0.0306) 
3.65*** .22440 
(.0973) 
2.31** 
Occupational Categories 
Manage 0.4937 
(0.0555) 
8.89*** 0.3307 
(0.0731) 
4.52*** 0.3987 
(0.1634) 
2.44*** 0.49047 
(0.0482) 
10.16*** 0.25133 
(0.0653) 
3.84*** 0.4184 
(.1374) 
3.04*** 
 
Continued— 
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Profess 0.3459 
(0.0379) 
9.12*** 0.1034 
(0.0714) 
1.45* 0.1926 
(0.1580) 
1.22 0.3447 
(0.0406) 
8.49*** 0.05842 
(0.0741) 
0.79 0.1885 
(.1795) 
1.05 
Tech 0.0711 
(0.0259) 
2.75*** -0.2392 
(0.0572) 
–4.18*** 0.1922 
(0.1215) 
1.58* 0.0710 
(0.0239) 
2.97*** -0.2486 
(0.0519) 
–4.79*** 0.1931 
(.1033) 
1.87* 
Service -0.1435 
(0.0394) 
–3.64*** -0.2057 
(0.0609) 
–3.37*** -0.1063 
(0.1815) 
–0.64 -0.1456 
(0.0261) 
–5.57*** -0.2795 
(0.0464) 
–6.02*** –.1288 
(.1509) 
-.85 
 
Skill -0.1689 
(0.0784) 
–2.16** -0.4411 
(0.1402) 
–3.15*** 0.2168 
(0.2855) 
0.76 – –3.51*** -0.4345 
(0.1408) 
–3.08*** .24045 
(.1728) 
1.39 
 
Craft 0.0294 
(0.0827) 
0.35 0.0192 
(0.0666) 
0.29 –0.1138 
(0.1421) 
–0.80 0.02332 
(0.0433) 
0.54 -0.0767 
(0.0473) 
–1.62* –.09752 
(.1012) 
-.96 
Plant  
 
0.0049 
(0.0924) 
0.05 0.0896 
(0.0739) 
1.21 –0.0734 
(0.1548) 
–0.47 –0.0019 
(0.0467) 
–0.04 -0.0256 
(0.0481) 
–0.53 –.05469 
(.1313) 
-.42 
Element –0.1686 
(0.0333) 
–5.06*** –0.27286 
(0.05614) 
–4.86*** –0.1426 
(0.1275) 
–1.12 –0.1690 
(0.0288) 
–5.85*** -0.3102 
(0.0483) 
–6.41*** –.13490 
(.0943) 
-1.43 
Selectivity terms 
Lambda1 –0.0086 
(0.0997) 
–0.09 – – – – – – – – – – 
Lambda2 – – 0.17383 
(0.0746) 
2.33*** – – – – – – – – 
Lambda3 – – – – -0.0689 
(0.3029) 
-0.23 – – – – – – 
Constant 2.16805 
(0.03698) 
5.86*** 1.01127 
(0.119120)
8.49*** 2.08674 
(0.9834) 
2.12** 2.14137 
(0.20643) 
10.37 1.068219 
(0.12479) 
8.56*** 1.89388 
(.48738) 
3.89*** 
 Number of observation = 
3310 
F(31, 3278)=90.37 
Prob>F=0.0000 
R-squared=0.4608 
Adjusted R-
square=0.4557 
Root MSE=0.43723 
Number of observation = 
3694 
F(31, 3662)=77.90 
Prob>F=0.0000 
R-squared=0.3974 
Adjusted R-
square=0.3923 
Root MSE=0.5527 
Number of observation = 
348 
F(31, 316)=12.51 
Prob>F=0.0000 
R-squared=0.5510 
Adjusted R-
square=0.5069 
Root MSE=0.50841 
Number of observation =  
3310 
F( 30,  3279)    =  81.17 
Prob > F        =  0.0000 
R-squared      =  0.4608 
Root MSE     =  .43716
  
Number of obs =  3694 
F( 30,  3663)    =  65.93 
Prob > F       =  0.0000 
R-squared     =  0.3965 
Root MSE    =  .55304 
Number of obs= 348 
F( 30,  317)  = 7.02 
Prob > F        =  0.000 
R-squared =  .5509 
Root MSE  = .50765 
Note:  All the estimates are white hetroscadastic consistent. 
     ***Denotes significant at 1 percent level of significance. **Denote significant at 5 percent level of significance. *10 percent level of significant using 2-tailed test.  
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